Affect, Habit, Predictive Processing and 'Not-Uncognitive' Automatic Action: A New Approach to the Interface Problem

How do representational intentions control, non-accidentally, nonrepresentational motor processes? If one answers using Enactivist work, starting from the body and the nonrepresentational and working up to intentions, this challenge becomes a dilemma. The other horn being “how is it that the environment doesn’t always trigger movement.” This is called the interface problem. My strategy to answering one horn of the dilemma of the interface problem is by bringing intention and motor processes conceptually closer together. Automatic action, while not open-endedly cognitive, is still “not uncognitive” and is often intentional such that motor processing often vetoes representational intention. But also, using a new theory that the brain is a “predictive processor” that works astonishingly like Bayesian updating and linking this to work on “pervasively socially penetrated perception” and affordances, I argue that intention is often not as fully deliberative and propositional as traditionally assumed either. I answer the second horn of the dilemma, about Enactivist answers, by enhancing my outline of emotion from the first chapter by arguing that affect is also predictively processing which changes perception and affordances from the inside such that identical environmental triggers at a different time will yield different actions or no action at all.